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Abstract. The paper’s aim is a critical reconstruction concerning the 
ideas of the most renowned representatives of the Hungarian Popular 
Movement: László Németh, Ferenc Erdei, and István Bibó . It contextualizes 
the notion of “populism”, which has semantically become overburdened 
up to now: it means everything and nothing . The Hungarian Populist 
Movement must be interpreted in the interwar Central-Eastern European 
and Hungarian contexts . The notion of dual society was a catchword for the 
abovementioned thinkers; according to its basic tenet, in Hungarian society, 
there is a symbiosis of modern and premodern segments . The demand for 
emancipation of the peasantry as a common denominator was frequently 
connected with the idea of alternative modernization; it was imagined as an 
autochthonous development different from the Western European models .
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Introduction
After the Trianon Treaty (1920) resulting in the mutilation of historical Hungary, 
the aristocracy- and gentry-dominated Hungarian political elites found themselves 
1 This paper is an edited and enlarged version of earlier lectures held at the conferences organized 
in Warsaw and in Budapest (2014, 2015) within the framework of the Polish–Hungarian bilateral 
academic research project entitled The Impact of Noble Legacy in Shaping Citizenship in Central 
Europe (2014–2016) . An interim research report of this project appeared in volume 61/2016 of 
the Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej. The research is going to be continued in 
the framework of another Polish–Hungarian bilateral academic research project entitled The 
Role of Intelligentsia in Shaping Collective Identities of Poles and Hungarians in [the] 19th 
and 20th Centuries (2017–2019) . In this paper, as a starting point, I lean on the results of my 
earlier research work carried on within the framework of a project sponsored by the Hungarian 
Scientific Research Fund (OTKA K 104643).
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in an uneasy situation (Lendvai 2003: 388) . The country had lost two thirds of 
its territory and half of its population; the political mood of the élites and the 
masses made impossible other foreign policy than one aiming to reclaim, at least 
partly, the lost territories . The wounded national consciousness sought solace in 
irredentism elevated to quasi-religious position. The lessons at elementary schools 
in the interwar-period Hungary began every morning with the “Hungarian Credo”: 
I believe in God/ I believe in a Fatherland/ I believe in eternal divine justice/ I 
believe in Hungary’s resurrection!/Amen (Bíró–Balogh 2007) .
Concerning the power relations and Hungary’s geopolitical situation, the 
revision of the Trianon Treaty was not possible without the support of a major 
power being interested in the reconfiguration of state borders in Central and 
Eastern Europe . The ally with Nazi Germany seemed an appropriate means for 
achieving the fervently hoped aim of revision . The results, at the beginning, 
seemed to justify this policy: as the consequence of the First and Second Vienna 
Awards in 1938 and 1940, Hungary had reclaimed some of its former territories 
from Czechoslovakia and Romania, but in the summer of 1943, at the time of 
the Szárszó meeting, after the battle of Stalingrad, the German defeat and the 
potential withdrawal of border revisions with it foreshadowed themselves .
What concerns Hungary’s inner situation in the fields of economy, society, and 
domestic policy after the trauma of Trianon, we can say – taking the risks of 
simplification – that the process of modernization that had been accelerated in the 
period of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy between 1867–1914 came to a stop . 
At the same time, economic consolidation, in spite of the loss of the major part of 
economic resources, was successful until the years of the Great Depression, but 
societal structure had got stymied: feudal and modern social structures coexisted . 
It was the situation of a “dual society”, as described by the sociologist Ferenc 
Erdei, whose ideas will be treated in this paper . At the same time, there was a 
social fermentation during the whole interwar period, and the question of the 
reforms was on the agenda . Aristocracy- and gentry-bred political elites co-opted 
strata from the rich peasantry and the petit bourgeois, but the power relations did 
not change essentially . The political regime of Hungary can be described with 
the term of “elective or electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006) . There was 
a multi-party system without a real political competition: the challengers of the 
ruling party did not have a real chance to get political power . Different reform 
movements, from the right to the left, tried to enter into the political arena and 
change the petrified political constellation. It was a very symptomatic fact that 
there was not a secret suffrage in the Hungarian countryside until 1939 – the 
voters had to cast their votes publicly in the presence of the members of the 
election committees .
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The Hungarian Populist Movement (Borbándi 1976): 
The Peasantry and the Idea of Hungarian “Sonderweg” 
to Modernity
The economic depression of 1929–1933 had struck the countryside peasantry 
stronger than the city dwellers . The Hungarian land reform after the First World 
War did not put end to the economic and social domination of the large estates, 
and the majority of the much segmented Hungarian peasantry consisted of small 
landowners with non-viable farms and landless agrarian workers. Dezső Szabó, 
one of the most renowned writers of the interwar period and the forefather of 
the Hungarian Populist Movement, proclaimed the idea of a peasant revolution 
connected to the idea of a new, second acquisition of the Hungarian Fatherland. 
(This was a historical allusion to the acquisition of the Carpathian Basin by 
the Hungarian tribes a thousand years earlier .) Szabó orchestrated his theory 
in a xenophobic, ethnicist style, fabricating a mythical Manichean history of 
philosophy in which Hungarian history was presented as a continuous struggle 
between the ethnically foreign ruling elites: the aristocracy, the high priests 
of the Catholic Church, in modern times, the bourgeoisie and the “true-born”, 
ethnically “pure” Hungarian peasantry (Kovács 2007) . There was a strange 
discrepancy between this conception and the post-war reality: the shrunk 
Hungary, as a consequence of the disaggregation of the former multi-ethnical 
political unit, the so-called Saint Stephen’s Empire, became an almost ethnically 
homogeneous country . There were no sizable minorities, except the highly 
assimilated Hungarian Jewry. So, the theory of Dezső Szabó was an example of 
scapegoat mechanism; a response of a traumatized community by the shock of 
the diminution of historical Hungary. Dezső Szabó, similarly to other interwar-
period Eastern European populist ideologues, did not reject modernization in 
toto; instead of it, he imagined an alternative modernity compatible with the 
Hungarian national character (Kovács 2015, Trencsényi 2012); his core idea was 
an autochthon, third-road modernization .
At the same time, Dezső Szabó and his ethnicist-xenophobic tone meant just one 
thread in the multi-colored fabric of the Hungarian Popular Movement . It is undeniable 
that the ethnocentric approach, to some extent, was present in the case of many of its 
protagonists, but it did not hold true for everybody; there were important exceptions: 
Zoltán Szabó and István Bibó must be mentioned in this respect . Speaking about 
populism nowadays, one should mention a methodological problem . This category 
has semantically been overburdened; instead of categorizing for a phenomenon in 
the field of history of ideas, it is frequently used for stigmatization: this label is stuck 
to the forehead of the actual bad guy expelling him/her from the company of decent 
people (Piccone 1995) . Populism itself is undeniably responsible for this confusion: 
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it embraces different historical phenomena being far away from each other in space 
and time, from the democratic Jeffersonian-origin agrarian populism in America 
through the South American variant á la Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina to the 
Eastern European peasant populism in Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary 
(Canovan 1981: 8–16) .
However, for a time, the Hungarian Popular Movement was a political factor 
emerging in the thirties . It embraced a wide political spectrum and cut across 
the ideological borders of the political right and left . A common denominator 
was the idea of the emancipation of peasantry . It is rooted in the so-called 
sociography movement of well-known Hungarian writers and sociologists who, 
in their books, called the public attention to the miserable condition of Hungarian 
peasantry which, for them, was a group of outcasts and the potential resource for 
an autochthon modernization at the same time (Némedi 1985) . The protagonists 
of the movement represented a new young generation socialized in the post-war 
Hungary; their first imprints had been got in the troubled atmosphere of the late 
twenties and the early thirties when a temporary consolidation was replaced by 
the despairing years of the Great Depression with extremely high unemployment 
and pauperization . Such authors were under thirty when their books appeared . 
The specificity of the genre of this sociography was a mixture of empirical 
sociological approach and a subjective literal tone . The titles of their books were 
expressive, provoking the attention and conscience of their potential readers . The 
book of Imre Kovács entitled Néma forradalom (Silent Revolution) dealt with the 
phenomenon of only child concerning the peasants who, by this way, tried to 
prevent the parceling of the land among their successors . The author depicted 
the depressed, desperate mood, the fatalistic hopelessness preventing peasants 
from social activism to improve their conditions . Géza Féja, in his book entitled 
Viharsarok (Corner of Storm) described the peasant life of south-eastern Hungary, 
which had been a traditional land of peasant revolts in the past, and warned the 
ruling élites to the possibility of a peasant uprising . Zoltán Szabó’s sociography 
entitled Cifra nyomorúság (Ornamented Poverty) dealt with the peasant life of 
north-eastern Hungary, the so-called “palóc” region, and pointed out that the 
over-decorated, magnificent folk costume of this region was a symptom of a crisis: 
a substitute activity in the lack of real chances for upward social mobility . In 
his work entitled Parasztok (Peasants), the talented young sociologist of peasant 
origin, Ferenc Erdei applied a more scientific sociological method than the above-
mentioned sociographers, who were belletrists; he made a comparative analysis 
of the different historical trajectories of peasantry of European regions, albeit his 
approach was not without a lyrical, subjective tone, and its language proved the 
author’s literal talents .
Hungarian populism was a multi-colored movement whose representatives, 
writers, ethnographers, sociographers, and sociologists had a leaning toward 
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third-road theories based on the idea of alternative modernization different from 
the models realized in the western parts of Europe (Rohkrämer 1999) . In Germany, 
this kind of cultural criticism was connected to the movement of conservative 
revolution (Mohler 1989, Woods 1996) . At the core of these theories was the 
motif of dual society; in Hungarian society, according to this conception, there 
is an uneasy and enforced symbiosis between pre-modern, feudal and modern, 
and capitalistic social structures both on the upper and lower levels of social 
hierarchy . This phenomenon involved some kind of co-tenancy on the level 
of social consciousness: modern, bourgeois ethos coexisted with noble-origin 
gentry mentality and gained domination in public life from state bureaucracy 
and administration to party politics .
Hungary at Cross-Roads: The Meeting of Szárszó for 
Hungarian Public Intellectuals in 1943
During the Second World War, Ferenc Erdei entered in a new phase of his 
intellectual carrier . In the thirties, he belonged to the abovementioned third-
road thinkers visioning an autochthon, grassroots modernization based on the 
initiatives of peasant entrepreneurs . He assumed that such grassroots will provide 
the required models for a transformation different from the Western European 
historical development, which will result in a bourgeois society: the peasantry 
that has lost its historic identity and culture will be transformed into a group of 
agrarian producers in accordance with the ethos of the capitalist market economy . 
According to the evidence of his lecture presented at the 1943 Szárszó meeting, he 
gave up his former intellectual-ideological position (Pintér 1983: 188–209) . Dual 
society, as a referential framework, remained essential in his conception, but, as 
his lecture proved it, he drew a radically different practical-political conclusion 
from the theory . Erdei gave a historical-sociological analysis of Hungary of the 
period between the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 and the Second 
World War . There was an uneasy co-tenancy of pre-modern and modern social 
structures; aristocracy, gentry, and peasantry on the one hand, bourgeoisie and 
working class on the other hand . There was a tacit agreement among the élites: 
aristocracy and gentry possessed political power, while bourgeoisie possessed 
the key positions of the modern, capitalist market economy . Erdei’s train of 
thought did not lack a light version of ethnicist approach: he pointed out that 
capitalist élites in Hungarian capitalism had been recruited from ethnically 
foreign social groups, but – using typically Marxian categories – he emphasized 
the interest coalition between the gentry and the bourgeoisie in the maintaining 
of the feudal-capitalist system based on the exploitation of the peasantry and the 
working class . As Erdei pointed out, the dual system in the interwar period had 
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been modernized: the gentry occupied the key positions of state bureaucracy and 
public service; the capitalist economy had to accept some kind of state control, 
while the social basis of the system had been broadened by the co-optation of the 
upper strata of petit bourgeoisie and rich peasantry . In 1943, Erdei did not believe 
any more in the prospect of a third-road modernization based on peasantry . He 
became a fellow traveler, a “Mitfahrer” of communists: in the conclusion of 
his lecture of 1943, he emphasized that the only possible solution would be a 
political transformation by the agency of the working class . Bourgeois democracy 
would only be a temporary period on the road leading to socialist democracy .
 László Németh, the best known third-road thinker of the interwar period, was 
the debate partner of Ferenc Erdei during the meeting of Szárszó . Németh was a 
writer and ideologist, an emblematic figure of the interwar Hungarian Populist 
Movement . In the ‘20s, he established a one-man journal named Tanú (Eyewitness) 
of which he was the author, editor, and publisher at the same time . This journal 
had a great influence on the contemporary Hungarian intellectuals. His cultural 
criticism had been inspired by Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher on the 
one hand and the German neoconservative Tat-circle on the other hand . The 
conception of Németh László was an amalgamation of an élite theory, a culture-
centered program of national regeneration and cultural criticism (Kovács 2013, 
Trencsényi 2012: 93–94) . Every century, he asserts, has a central idea on which 
the intellectual and material civilization of the age is based . The 19th century was 
the age of factory, whose main idea, “gigantomaniac” industrialism, was based 
on a shallow calculative rationalism on the whole life . One of the main vices 
of the 19th century was that it had desacralized nature; instead of treating and 
respecting it as a sacred organic wholeness, this century reckoned nature as an 
object of exploitation . Human being had been torn out of the nature and became 
a one-dimensional homo oeconomicus seeing nature exclusively as a repository 
of raw materials, an object waiting for exploitation .
The 20th century, in the historical philosophy of Németh, is the age of garden; 
this means a return of an earth-bound, human-sized existence aiming at replacing 
the gigantomania of the 19th century . Németh was a typical third-road thinker: both 
capitalism and bolshevism were for him the outmoded relics of the 19th century . 
His option is an interesting utopia mixing earth-bound human existence with a 
high-cultured elitist way of life; it can be realized in small communities devoted 
to horticulture and high culture at the same time; in his view, homo oeconomicus 
will be replaced by homo aesthetico-culturalis . His utopian essay entitled Kapások 
(Gardeners with Hoes) (1935) described a high-cultured commune, whose dwellers, 
while working in the garden, are reciting poems of Keats or reading Aeschylus, 
naturally in Greek language (Németh 1992b) . Németh envisioned the “revolution 
of quality”; the 20th century, in contrast with the 19th century whose leading idea 
was quantity, is the age of quality including professional-intellectual work and 
77Burghers, Intellectuals, and Gentries. The Utopia of Alternative...
handicraft . This revolution will put an end to gigantomaniac industrialism; it will 
represent a human-sized economic and social order, which resacralizes human 
life and promotes reconciliation with nature .
In his lecture of 1943 in Szárszó, Németh reformulated his third-road 
modernization utopia (Pintér 1983: 214–226) . The antagonism of the exploiting 
and exploited classes, he argues, will be dissolving in the process of middle-
classicization in which the classical factory proletariat of the 19th century 
will disappear . Németh depicted a utopian vision of the emerging society of 
intellectuals and strongly refused both the Anglo-Saxon capitalism and the 
Russian bolshevism, both being considered inappropriate models for post-war 
Hungary .
Clericals, Intellectuals, and Gentries – Utopic and Real 
Ways to Modernity
“To be a master is a social role in a medieval feudal society based on estates, 
to be a member of the middle-class is a social role in modern capitalistic class 
society, while to be an intellectual is a perpetual human role transcending from 
concrete, restricted, contingent, historical situations” (Bibó 1986: 516) .2 This 
quotation is from an essay of István Bibó (1911–1979), who belonged, together 
with Erdei, to another generation: he was a decade younger than László Németh . 
Bibó was a political thinker and the bulk of his oeuvre was produced during 
the war years and mainly after the war, but the Hungarian Populist Movement 
was one of the first imprints in his intellectual career. His quoted essay, entitled 
Értelmiség és szakszerűség (Intelligentsia and Professionalism) was written in 
1947, one of the crisis-laden periods of the Hungarian history in the 20th century . 
The direct context of the writing was the post-war situation of Hungary; the 
country was among the losers of the war, and the peace settlement of Paris 
practically reinforced the Peace Treatment of Trianon of 1919, sanctifying again 
and for good the decomposition of the historical Greater Hungary . The interwar 
Hungarian political élite, according to Bibó, was dominated by the gentry, which 
had traditionally possessed alone the political positions in the arena of the 
local, county politics, at the county meetings and after the Austrian Hungarian 
Compromise (1867) occupied the administrative-bureaucratic positions of the 
new state and became the co-tenant of the aristocracy as a political power holder 
in the field of national politics.
These developments were strongly criticized not only by the interwar 
Hungarian populist thinkers as Dezső Szabó and László Németh or Ferenc Erdei 
but by the conservative historian Gyula Szekfű as well. The latter, in his seminal 
2 Translation of the study’s author (from Hungarian) .
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book entitled Három nemzedék (Three Generations), introduced the narrative 
of the history of decline, the Verfallsgescichte, and depicted a gloomy picture 
about the social-political-cultural consequences of the gentry-dominated public 
life with preponderant state apparatuses (on Szekfű, see: Dénes 2015). His 
panacea was a conservative reform reinstating a modernized, streamlined Saint 
Stephen’s Empire . The abovementioned populist thinkers vehemently refused 
the conservative solution suggested by Szekfű and insisted on the idea of a social 
revolution which aimed at emancipating peasantry, the overwhelming majority 
of the population .
 What we are interested in is the gentry critique of Hungarian populism and the 
problem of intelligentsia which is frequently associated with it. This association 
is at the core of the theory of László Németh, whose history of philosophy is 
based upon the utopian idea of intellectualization and spiritualization of both 
the political power and the whole society . In the opinion of Németh, the essence 
of modern European history is the growing importance of intelligentsia; modern 
society is dominated by the middle-class, whose number and influence are 
increasing . The author assumes that the middle-class is built on the features and 
mentality of the intelligentsia; high culture plays an ever-growing role in the 
public life of modern nations .
From this hypothesis, Németh deduces the necessity of an elite change . In the 
early thirties, when he criticizes the gentry-dominated Hungarian political life, 
he describes the Hungarian gentry – metaphorically speaking – as a rider having 
a great routine how to ride: he knows when the horse needs spurring and when 
it needs keeping a tight rein, but he does not know where to ride to (Németh 
1992a: 553) . According to this metaphor, the gentry own a hollow political 
routine without the intent and conception of modernization . For Németh, this 
modernization has to be realized by new élites recruited from the intelligentsia . 
This conception leads Németh to the elaboration of the utopian conceptualization 
of the society of intellectuals as presented at the meeting of Szárszó in 1943 . 
Let us return now to the essay of Bibó, from which I excerpted the above 
quotation about the difference between the gentry, the middle-class, and the 
intelligentsia . The title of the essay, Értelmiség és szakszerűség (Intelligentsia 
and Professionalism), reflects not only the impact of the intelligentsia-focused 
utopia of László Németh, but it adopts the theory of European and Hungarian 
social development given by his contemporary historian, István Hajnal (1892–
1956) (Kovács 2016) . Hajnal did not belong to the Hungarian Populist Movement, 
but his ideas deeply influenced Ferenc Erdei and István Bibó; László Németh 
respected him as well. Hajnal’s original field of research was the history of 
literacy . For Hajnal, writing – on which literacy is based – is a special kind of 
communication technology which grows out from the primary – so to speak 
– nature-given communication technology: it is the skill of speaking based on 
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the human ability of thinking . Empirical research focusing on paleography 
was associated with an objectification theory borrowed by Hajnal from German 
philosophy . Hajnal elaborated a structuralist historiography which is similar to 
the theory of contemporary French historians of the Annales Circle as March 
Bloch or Fernand Braudel . Human being, from this point of view, possesses an 
ability which gives to mankind a unique position in the animal kingdom; he/
she is able to objectify his/her thoughts in lasting external mental and physical 
structures, including customs, social institutions, and physical artifacts – tools, 
machines, towns, etc . This approach by Hajnal is associated with a conservative 
philosophical anthropology which defines human person as a structure-creating 
being; in this theory, rationality is a special albeit sophisticated kind of animal 
instinct of self-preservation .
In his theory, Hajnal amalgamates the Durkheiman sociological approach with 
the anti-Weberian history of philosophy . The individual is enmeshed in the 
net of social institutions being reproduced from generation to generation; these 
institutions set a border for the rational individual actions . There are two kinds 
of social organizing methods that are rooted in basic human abilities which play 
role in the genesis of human society: rational social practices based upon the 
individual rationality and customary social practices based upon the ability of 
human being for objectification, i.e. the creation of mental and physical structures 
from the raw materials of thoughts and physical surroundings .
For Hajnal, medieval Europe is an ideal type of social organization because it 
is based upon customary social practices that restrict the playground of rational 
practices which otherwise can disintegrate the fabric of social institutions . This 
kind of traditionalism is not rigid and does not represent a petrified society; on 
the contrary, it leaves room for innovations which do not endanger the existence 
of lower social strata, first of all that of peasantry, constituting the overwhelming 
majority of medieval society . Landlords and serves were, of course, in an uneven 
social situation comparing to each other, but there was some kind of mutuality 
between them warranted by customs; it prescribed obligations and rights for both 
of them . The landlord could be cruel and inhuman in his personal contacts with 
his peasants, but the law of custom prevented him to increase their burdens as he 
would have pleased to do . Medieval society, in the long run, became a mosaic of 
groups possessing privileges sanctified in written charters. Mutuality, after many 
centuries of evolutive development, interwove the whole society from the bottom 
to the top and defined the social existence of both lower and upper strata in their 
horizontal and vertical social relations . This development vested the clerics, i .e . 
the possessors of the skill of writing, with extraordinary social importance; they 
were the managers of social relations . Clerics, in the theory of Hajnal, were the 
keepers of the small circles of liberty appearing in the form of group privileges 
(Hajnal 1993: 45). The clerical fulfilled a special social function rooted in his 
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professional knowledge; he was the possessor of the ability of writing in a world 
which, in a growing degree, depended upon literacy . So, clerical, the historical 
prefiguration of modern lay intellectual, being supported by his special skills, 
became the representative of the society: protected it from the misuses of the 
political élites. This was not the consequence of personal qualities or that of 
theological subtleties and the moral elevation of Christian doctrine; Hajnal 
deduced it from the abovementioned social constellations, first of all from 
customary social practices .
The key position of the clerical rooted in the professional manner in which he 
conducted his business . In the theory of Hajnal, the regions of Europe differ from 
each other in such a degree that they were able to produce social structures based 
on customary social practices fortified by the virtue of literacy. Social structures 
gave birth to an intellectual stratum which, due to its professionalism-based 
independence, enjoyed general social respect and from which the crew of emerging 
state bureaucracy and public administration was recruited . This stratum became 
a counterbalance to the traditional political élites, the aristocracy and the gentry .
Following the logic of Hajnal’s theory, Bibó considers that Hungary is in a 
middle position between Western-Europe-based customary social organization 
and Eastern-Europe-based rational, despotic social organization . (I treated the 
political philosophy of Bibó in my earlier essay: Kovács 2012) . There are segments 
of an intellectual stratum which developed an ethos based on professionalism 
and intellectual consciousness but, on the whole, intellectual roles and feudal-
origin gentry roles have been intermingled . The turning point in his analysis is 
the lost independence struggle fought against the Habsburg dynasty in 1848–
1849 . The failure caused a shock for the Hungarian cultural-political elites: their 
risk-taking venturesome spirit and initiative ability had evaporated, and they 
sank in a passive-defensive behavior. In the first half of the 19th century, in the 
Age of Reforms, there emerged a non-noble-origin intellectual stratum named 
honorácior, which began to merge with the noble-origin gentry intellectuals . 
This gave a chance to produce a new intellectual stratum apart from the gentry 
class background and acquired a professional ethos; this stratum would have 
been devoid of honor-centered privilege-guarding, belligerent pre-modern noble 
attitude and inclined to give up its distance-keeping social behavior from the 
lower strata of society .
The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 for Bibó – who, from this respect, 
shared the aversion of such populist thinkers as Dezső Szabó and László Németh 
– was a fatal moment of the Fall (on them, see: Dénes 1999) . The non-noble origin 
honorácior-intellectuals and the noble-origin gentry intellectuals kept emerging 
– Bibó argues – but under different conditions; the emerging new intellectual 
stratum was dominated by gentry mentality . Its new denomination “úriember” 
symbolized this metamorphosis . The term can be translated as “gentleman”, but 
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in Hungarian it has different connotations than in English . In the late-19th-century 
Hungary, this term denoted a social type in a cast-like society which jealously 
guarded its privileges and emphasized its distance from the lower social strata . Its 
group consciousness had been determined by gentry values and not by the sense 
of vocation originating in the acquisition of skills gained in higher education at 
university . Following the theory of his sociologist friend, Ferenc Erdei, who had 
elaborated the theory of dual society, Bibó emphasized the state dependence of 
this new intellectual stratum which occupied the positions of state bureaucracy 
and local administration . After the First World War, gentleman-intellectuals 
became one of the main components of the so-called Christian-middle class: their 
power became strengthened through positions in ministries, county and town 
administration, but the gentry mentality was preserved . Bibó, who was working 
for years in the Ministry of Justice before 1945, tells an anecdote-like story about 
one of his colleagues . He was an old court secretary, as Bibó remarks, an excellent 
gentleman and a wrong, incompetent clerk, who once, in his ill-humor, angrily 
said: “Damn the peasant who invented that a gentleman needs a university 
diploma for earning his livelihood!” (Bibó 1986: 512) .3
Dual Society and Political Hysteria
In his theory, Bibó complemented the structuralist approach of the World War 
in the short post-bellum period; after the communist takeover of 1949, he lived 
in an inner emigration without the facilities of publication (on his oeuvre and 
life, see: Berki 1992, Dénes 2015) . His main term for describing the special socio-
psychological attitude of our region was communal-political hysteria, which is a 
pathological state of a society . Political hysterias in Central-Eastern Europe can be 
traced back to structural and socio-psychological causes . This region produced 
special hybrid dual societies with surviving pre-modern and emerging modern 
segments: aristocracy, nobility, peasantry on the one hand and bourgeoisie and 
the working class on the other hand . Collective mentality has been determined 
by the archaic, military-aggressive attitudes of feudal élites, while nation 
building has been hindered by imperial political structures and war defeats . In 
Bibó’s theory, the lack of an autonomous intellectual stratum emancipated from 
gentry is a structural deformity, a Sonderweg comparing to Western-European 
developmental models .
Bibó focuses his attention on the problems of nation building in Central-Eastern 
Europe, which run a different historical trajectory than it did in the western 
parts of the continent . Empires, as multi-ethnical archaic political structures, 
had distorted this process: nationalism and liberalism turned against each other 
3 Translation of the study’s author (from Hungarian) .
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and gave way to collectivistic, authoritarian political regimes in the 20th century 
(Dénes (ed .) 2006) . State borders and linguistic borders did not coincide; national 
communities lived here in a paralyzing state of fear from annihilation . For Bibó, the 
exemplary case of this pathological development is Hungary, the country having 
lost two-thirds of its territory and half of its population after the First World War . 
His theory runs parallel in many ways with the idea of Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
a German contemporary historian, whose basic notion is the culture of defeat 
(Schivelbusch 2003) . The shock of war defeat, Schivelbusch argues, generates 
pathological symptoms in the collective psyche of modern nations in the age of 
mass society . Political hysteria as a key notion of the theory of Bibó is, from many 
respects, similar to the idea of collective neurosis explained by Schivelbusch . 
The suffered trauma disturbs the inner psychic balance of the community and 
prevents its perception of reality . Communities are supposed to be pathologically 
connected to the memory of the shock and unable to recognize and solve their 
actual problems posed by reality . Communities are thus escaping into a world of 
fantasy, into a world of false problems and pseudo-solutions .
For the community concerned, the suffered shock is a starting point of 
collective-political hysteria . This social illness produces different symptoms 
from scapegoating to sensitiveness towards conspiracy theories . In Bibó’s theory, 
political hysteria is a self-generating process which leads to a vicious circle (Bibó 
2015: 44–45). It produces a coherent self-affirmative world view. The starting point 
is the misperception of reality caused by a pathological fixation to the experience of 
the bygone shock having disturbed the adequate relation to reality. It is analogous 
to the idea of pathological object fixation known from the theory of psychoanalysis. 
Political hysteria creates a pseudo-world: it offers logical responses to the problems 
arising within the borders of this self-enclosed reality . But the price of this coherence 
is the loss of touch with the truly existing world and the inability of recognizing 
and solving the actual and urgent problems of the community .
Conclusions
The interwar Hungarian Populist Movement was rooted in the special intellectual-
cultural-political climate of this period . It was a many-colored, loosely organized 
movement out of which we can outline the figures of Dezső Szabó, László Németh, 
and István Bibó . Albeit different from each other in many respects, these thinkers 
can be connected to several common ideas such as the concept of dual society, 
inclination to third-road theories, and receptiveness to cultural criticism . Their 
imagined alternative modernization, which was not only a Hungarian peculiarity, 
was a favorite idea among the third-road theorists in the interwar years of the 
central-eastern region .
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